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RIGHT OF A SURETY TO SUBROGATION
AFTER PAYMENT ON A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
BY

JOHN

E.

FOURT

A surety is a promisor in another's behalf. After
a surety pays the amount of the obligation to the creditor, he becomes subrogated to all the remedies available to the creditor against the principal debtor. This
right
of subrogation should include the right
to bring
action against the principal
debtor on any securities
held by the creditor evidencing the obligation.
The law of suretyship in California, however,
holds that payment by a surety who is either primarily
or secondarily liable on a negotiable instrument "extinguishes" the obligation.
The paying surety is relegated to his action of assumpsit against his principal
debtor, based on an implied in fact promise of reimbursement.
This question of remedies is material since the
California Statute of Limitations on promisory notes is
four years, while the assumpsit statute of limitations
is two years.
Further, the note may contain provisions
allowing th'e holder to confess judgment, add costs of
collections, add interest, and waive defenses.
An accommodation indorser-surety who pays the
holder the face amount of the note either
before or
after
maturity, should be able to bring action on the
note against the maker-principal debtor to recover the
money paid out plus any added costs provided for in
the note.
California, in a long line of decisions following Yule vs. Bishop, 6 Cal. Unrep. 513, 62 Pac. 68, 133
Cal. 571, 65 Pac. 1094 (1907), has held contra.
In Yule
vs. Bishop, Corporation X executed a promissory note to
C, on which S was an accommodation indorser.
C requested S to pay the note after
maturity, and S did so,
taking an assignment of the note.
S then recovered judgment against the bankrupt maker.
The assignee of S then
filed action on the note and the judgment against the
shareholders to enforce a statutory liability.
The
California Supreme Court held that payment by S extinguished the obligation, and that the statutory liability of the shareholders could only be enforced by
an action in assumpsit, based on the reimbursement

The
rights of a surety against the principal debtor.
court based its decision on Civil Code, Section 1473.
The doctrine of subrogation developed in the English Equity courts, and was early adopted into the
Following the custom of London, payment by
common law.
a surety did not discharge a negotiable instrument. The
contrary doctrine was laid down by Lord Elden in Copis
vs. Middleton, 1 Turn & R 220 and by Lord Brougham in

Iodgson vs.

Shaw, 3 Mylne & K 183.

The California

court found that civil code Section 1473, enacted in
Parliament
1872, had adopted this later English rule.
changed the English law on this point in the 1856 Merthat
payment by a
Law Amendment and provided
cantile
a-negotiable
instrument.
does not
discharge
surety
Civil

Code Section

1949 as in 1907.

"Full

1473 still

reads

the same in

performance of an obligation,

by the party whose duty it is to Perform it, or by any
other person on his behalf, and with his assent, if
it."
(Emphasis
creditor,
extinguishes
accepted
by the
en1474, which was also
Civil
Code Section
added.)
"Performance of
an obligain
1872 provides
that
acted
liable
who are
jointly
several
persons
tion,
by one of
the
liability
of
all."*
under it,
extinguishes
It is suggested that when an accommodation indorser-surety pays the holder of a negotiable instrumen-t as a party secondarily liable, after default of
the maker-principal debtor, that the payment extinguishes his liability as indorser-surety, but does not
extinguish the primary liability of the maker-princiThe phrase "whose duty it is to perform
pal debtor.

it"

should be construed

to refer

to

the principal

debtor as between the maker and accommodation indorser,
instead of to the person secondarily liable on the
note, if
the common law rights of a surety as codito have
2848 and 2849 are
fied in
Civil
Code sections
meaning and effect.
"A surety, upon satisCivil Code Section 2848:
fying the obligation of the principal, is entitled to
creditor
then has against
enforce
every remedy which the
the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has
co-sureties
to
to require
all
his
expended, and also
to the
order
of
time
without
regard
contribute
thereto,
(Emphasis added).
in
which they became such."

Civil Code Section 2849:
"A surety is entitled
to the benefit of every security for the performance of
the
principal
obligation
held
by the creditor,
or by a
co-surety
at
the
time of
entering
into
the contract
of
suretyship,
or acquired by him afterwards, whether the
surety
was aware of
the
security
or not."
As a rule
of
construction,
the general
Civil
Code
Section 1473 on extinction of
obligations
should
be
harmonized with the more specific code sections 2848
and 2849 concerning
the
position
of sureties.
It is obvious that if the holder-creditor may
bring action on the note against the maker-principal
debtor,
and that
the
surety
after
payment may not
do
so,
that
the
surety
is
not
entitled
to enforce
every
remedy available
to the
creditor
as is
provided
in
Civil Code Section 2848.
Where the majority of American jurisdictions
cite N.I.L. Sections 119(1), 121, and 121(2) in support of the rule that payment by an accommodation
maker or accommodation indorser does not discharge the
note, California citing the same section's has held
contra.
For example see Marston Co. vs. Fisheries
Co., 201 Cal.
715,
258 Pac.
933 (1927),
where the
California Supreme Court cited N.I.L. Sections 120
and 121 (Civil. Code Sections 3201 and 3202) without
discussion as "not changing the California rule."
Texas, in Fox vs. Kroeger, 119 Texas 511, 35 S.W. 2d
679 (1931)
allowed the
accommodation indorser-surety
to be subrogated
to the
rights
of
the
holder-creditor
in filing action on the note against the makerprincipal
debtor.
This court
construed
the
N.I.L.
Sections 119(1), 121, and 121(2) as a group
N.I.L.
119(1) provides
"A negotiable
instrument is
discharged
by payment in
due course by or
on behalf
of
the principal
debtor."
Section 121
provides "Where the instrument is paid by a party
secondarily liable th-ereon, it is not discharged,
but the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may
strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements,
and again negotiate
the
instrument,
except" N.I.L.
121(2) "where it was made or excepted for accommodation, and Has been paid by the party accommodated."
The Texas court
found that
payment by a party

secondarily liable does not discharge the instrument by
express provision of NII.L. Section 121.
This Texas
Court construed N.I.L. Section 121(2) to mean that payment by the accommodated party discharges the instrumen-t,
but that payment by the accommodating drawer or accomodating indorser does not discharge the instrument.
Another analagous line of cases in California have
held that payment by an accommodation maker either bethe
the
note
extinguishes
maturity
of
fore
or
after
obligation, citing Civil Code Section 1473. The California Supreme Court squarely so decided in James vs.
Yeager, 86 Cal. 186, 24 Pac. 1005 (1890).
It is submitted that the weight of authority has the better view
in holding contra.
In Pease vs. Syler, 78 Wash. 24,
138 Pac. 310 (1914), the Washington Supreme Court held
that the accommodation maker-surety could bring action
on the
note
against
his
co-maker principal
debtor,
after
paying the
holder
at
maturity.
The Washington Supreme
Court-distinguished the California cases as based on a
peculiar statute, and cited the Negotiable Instruments
Law Section's 120 and 121(2) as sustaining its position.
It

is submitted that the majority rule prevailing
outside
California
in
both
the
American and British
courts
will
best
meet the
needs of the
business
community.
Both nations have credit economies and laws
which will aid the securing of credit risks will be in
social favor.
Creditors often require borrowers to
produce persons as indemnitors on the proposed loan.
A person will more likely go surety for a needful borrower if his remedies against the borrower are the
equal of
the
creditor.
Technical arguments buttressing this social policy
include
the
harmonizing
of
the
California
Civil
Code Sections
on extinguishment
of
obligations
with
the
sections
concerning
the
rights
of
sureties.
The
construction given to sections 119(1),
121 and 121(2)
by the
majority
of the" American jurisdictions,
if
adopted in California, would change the present law.
Britton:
Bills and Arotes, 1943, at Page 1120, cites
the jurisdictions which are contra to the California
rule.
Bigelow:
Bills, Motes and Checks, Section 570
and 571, and Brannon:
Negotiable Instruments Law,
Sections 119 and 120, ar-e in accord.

